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ABSTRACT
Current theories cannot explain the coexistence of China’s
40 years of rapid economic growth and its imperfect financial sys-
tem, insufficient investor protection, and government interven-
tion. This study empirically tests hypotheses regarding the effects
of corruption on firms’ access to bank loans using econometric
models based on survey data of 2,848 enterprises in China col-
lected by the World Bank. The results show an inverted U-shaped
relationship between corruption and firms’ access to bank loans:
a low level of corruption increases firms’ access to bank loans,
whereas a high level of corruption hinders firms from obtaining
bank loans. Mild corruption may be a suboptimal choice for firms
seeking bank loans, and bank funds allocation based on corrup-
tion can achieve Pareto optimality among firms. Moreover, gov-
ernment guarantees are conducive to firms’ access to financing
and the link between corruption and firms’ access to bank loans
can be explained by the role of government guarantees. The
improvement of institutional quality is positively associated with
firms’ access to bank loans and weakens the effects of corruption
on firms’ external financing. This study thus sheds light on the
real effects of corruption and the determinants of firms’ access to
bank loans in developing countries.
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1. Introduction
There is no doubt that the effective allocation of bank loans is not only a necessary
condition for alleviating financial constraints of firms but also an important factor for
promoting economic growth. Firms need sufficient funds to carry out innovation and
investment, seize business opportunities and alleviate the development restrictions
caused by financing constraints. Therefore, how to ensure the Pareto optimisation of
bank loan allocation among firms has become a main task for entrepreneurs to
achieve commercial success and for developing countries to maintain sustained eco-
nomic growth. Developed financial markets and financial intermediaries are essential
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for economic growth (Rajan & Zinagales, 1998), as a well-functioning financial mar-
ket plays a vital role in the evaluation of investment projects, allocation of capital
resources and supervision of managers (Hsu et al., 2014). Financial intermediaries
promote investment productivity by providing funds to the best quality enterprises
(Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990). Moreover, fairness of the rule of law, protection of
private property and effective corporate governance are important factors explaining
enterprise value and economic growth (La Porta et al., 2000).
China’s economy has maintained rapid growth over the past 40 years that has been
referred to as growth miracle. However, China’s economic growth challenges main-
stream academic views. According to institutional economics theory, China’s eco-
nomic success should not have occurred, because it has an imperfect legal system,
inadequate investor protection, and excessive government intervention. At the same
time, although China’s institutional construction is lagging behind, its credit has
maintained stable and rapid growth over the past 30 years. Private enterprises have
higher productivity than state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but they have fewer external
financing channels than SOEs (Song et al., 2011). This phenomenon of sustained eco-
nomic growth in a backward institutional environment is often referred to as the East
Asia paradox. Scholars provide various explanations for this paradox, with political
promotion campaigns and fiscal decentralisation being the two main explanations
(Allen et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2015).
Although previous research on corruption is extensive, there are few studies on the
impact of corruption on firms’ access to bank loans. Moreover, this study differs
from prior research in that it argues that the current institutional environment hides
an alternative institutional arrangement that replaces formal institutions in bank
credit allocation tasks. This alternative institutional arrangement is an informal rule
based on corrupt acts, such as bribery. As in an auction mechanism, firms’ financing
activities based on bribery can achieve Pareto-suboptimal allocation. Corruption pro-
vides an effective incentive for public officials to introduce an alternative institutional
arrangement into the economy, which alleviates the inhibition of credit resource allo-
cation caused by the backwardness of formal institutions. With the establishment and
improvement of formal institutions, the market replaces the credit allocation function
of corruption, and corruption activities are accordingly reduced.
This paper uses the World Bank survey data for enterprises’ business environments
to investigate the effects of corruption on firms’ access to bank loans. In addition, we
analyze the role of government guarantees and institutional quality in corruption
affecting firm financing. This study estimates econometric models to examine the
hypotheses using a sample of 2,848 enterprises, including 148 SOEs and 2,700 non-
SOEs, from the World Bank’s 2012 survey on China’s enterprises, which provides a
better understanding of the effects of corruption on firms’ access to bank loans and
influencing factors of firm financing in developing countries.
The results show that the relationship between corruption and firms’ access to
bank loans is inverted U-shaped, which is different from views of corruption as a
stepping stone or stumbling block for firms to obtain bank credit. Specifically, low-
level corruption is beneficial for firms to obtain bank loans, whereas high-level cor-
ruption hinders firms from obtaining bank loans. Corruption is neither absolutely
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beneficial nor absolutely harmful in developing countries that have not yet fully
established a perfect market system, and the effects of corruption are influenced by
the quality of formal institutions. In addition, corrupt acts benefit firms in obtaining
government guarantees, which are conducive to these firms obtaining bank loans.
This paper provides empirical evidence for the inverted U-shaped relationship
between corruption and firms’ access to bank loans and provides favourable evidence
that can settle disputes over previous research conclusions.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses how the study
relates to the literature and proposes testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the meth-
odology and data. Section 4 presents and discusses the test results. Section 5 presents
conclusions, states the limitations of this article and offers suggestions for future study.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
2.1. Corruption as a stepping stone for firms’ access to bank loans
Financial institutions provide funds within a rigid and binding system, which leads to
the exclusion of firms that do not meet the conditions for financial institutions to issue
loans. Therefore, maintaining a good relationship with banks has become a strategic
behaviour for enterprises to obtain bank loans. Gift exchange generates important social
capital, enabling enterprises to maintain relations with officials (Cai et al., 2011).The
lubricant hypothesis suggests that corruption weakens the rigidity of the system, which
can make corrupt acts beneficial to economic development (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013;
Huntington, 1979). Specifically, corruption can soften the rigid system of loans, simplify
cumbersome loan procedures, reduce the loan approval waiting time and improve
investment efficiency (Levine et al., 2000; Lui, 1985). We regard bribery and other cor-
rupt acts as the second best choice to improve firms’ bank loan approval efficiency.
Financing under corrupt acts is like a bargaining process. Firms can obtain funds
through auctions, as financial institutions sell funds to the highest bidder. According to
bidding model theory (Beck & Maher, 1986; Lien, 1986), the credit allocation efficiency
of financial institutions remains unchanged in this case, and thus the lowest-cost enter-
prises can pay the largest bribes. Therefore, credit allocation mechanisms based on cor-
rupt acts enable the lowest-cost enterprises to obtain formal financing opportunities
from financial institutions. Although corruption generally prevents banks from lending
money to enterprises, it alleviates enterprises’ financing obstacles (Weill, 2011).
Information asymmetry increases the red tape of financial institutions, which
reduces credit allocation efficiency and increases transaction costs. Financial institu-
tions’ low cost of collecting business information is conducive to alleviate information
asymmetry; thus, they can make more effective decisions, and firms connected with
banks obtain bank loans more easily. The bribery of officials by firms reduces the
adverse effects of red tape and helps these firms obtain bank loans, although this
results in an increase in the short-term bank debt ratio (Chen et al., 2013; Fungacova
et al., 2015). Therefore, corruption acts promote the relationship between banks and
firms and are effective strategic behaviours for firms to obtain bank loans.
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Corruption has a positive effect on firms’ access to bank loans.
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2.2. Corruption as a stumbling block for firms’ access to bank loans
The rent-seeking view of Public choice theory holds that corruption is not conducive
to development (Krueger, 1974). Because of information asymmetry in the credit
rationing process, bank officers usually have decision rights on credit terms, such as
loan interest rates, loan maturities, and collateral types (Barth et al., 2009). Therefore,
the rights of bank officers may lead firms to bribe them. Bribery gives corrupt offi-
cials greater motivation to formulate more complicated loan terms, which leads firms
to increase their bribes to avoid these new terms (Guriev, 2004). Moreover, a high
level of corruption leads to opportunistic behaviours in inefficient systems, which
increases the non-performing loans generated by bank institutions due to loan
defaults. Corruption acts not only increase the uncertainty of banks’ avoidance of
default but also increase the risk of borrowers’ default, which reduces banks’ willing-
ness to lend to firms and increases the obstacles of firm financing (Qi & Ongena,
2019; Qian & Strahan, 2007; Wellalage et al., 2019).
The information asymmetry between banks and borrowers results in two effects:
adverse selection and reverse incentive (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). The adverse selection
effect refers to the fact that the rise of bank interest rate prevents low-risk borrowers
from entering the financial market. Adverse selection theory argues that low-quality
enterprises with poor financing ability are more motivated than high-quality enter-
prises to bribe officials to obtain bank loans. Therefore, to avoid adverse selection
and moral hazard, a typical practice of financial institutions is to formulate more
stringent firm loan terms; however, doing so increases borrowing costs and causes
firms to face more legal restrictions and financing constraints (Ayyagari et al., 2008;
Beck et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2009). The reverse incentive effect refers to the fact that
the higher the bank loan interest rate is, the greater the motivation of potential bor-
rowers to invest in higher-risk projects. According to reverse incentive theory, the
transaction cost of bank loans obtained through bribery is relatively high, which
encourages firms to invest in high-risk projects and increases the risk of bank
loan recovery.
Because of adverse selection and reverse incentive, firms increase their bribery,
which results in the rise of banks’ non-performing loans and the reduction of capital
supply by banks. Commercial bribery leads to inefficient rules, which increase the
cost for firms to obtain funds (Ahlin & Bose, 2007). Fortunately, timely confirmation
of loan losses can curb lending corruption and increase the likelihood of problematic
loans being discovered (Akins et al., 2017). In view of the above issues, the second
hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Corruption has a negative effect on firms’ access to bank loans.
2.3. The role of government guarantees in firms’ access to bank loans
The government has a great impact on banks’ lending decisions in government-led
economies and extends a helping hand to alleviate financial institutions’ concerns
regarding corporate moral hazards (Faccio et al., 2006; La Porta et al., 2002).
Government guarantees influence firms’ access to bank loans in two ways. First,
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government guarantees are important reputation assets and financing resources for
firms. Banking institutions’ behaviours are usually based on national policy considera-
tions in developing countries, so firms with government guarantees can share govern-
ments’ network resources to receive more support from banks, such as low-cost
loans. After the Chinese government implemented the economic stimulus plan, the
responses of SOEs and non-SOEs with political ties to investment opportunities wors-
ened, and SOEs obtained more resources than non-SOEs (Liu et al., 2018).
Second, because of implicit government guarantees, even if firms with state owner-
ship have poor management and performance, they have higher political status and
are generally considered safer than non-SOEs. State ownership can provide an impli-
cit guarantee for firms’ debt; therefore, firms with state ownership have a lower prob-
ability of bankruptcy than non-SOEs (Borisova et al., 2015). Private enterprises that
receive more government assistance are more likely to receive bank loans (Ruan
et al., 2018). Hence, firms try to find effective ways to obtain funds from financial
institutions and alleviate financing constraints, such as obtaining government guaran-
tees and bribing officials. However, government intervention in capital allocation dis-
torts the allocative function of the financial market and worsens the financing
environment of the private sector (Guariglia & Poncet, 2008). The third hypothesis is
stated as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Government guarantees facilitate firms’ access to bank loans.
3. Methodology and data
3.1. Empirical methodology
To investigate corruption and other factors that affect firms’ access to bank loans,
this study estimates various forms of the model below:
Lendi ¼ a0 þ a1Briberyi þ a2Briberysqi þ bZi þ lk þ xj þ ei (1)
where i indexes the firm and Lendi represents the credit or loan status of firm i,
which is defined as whether the firm has a line of credit or a loan from financial
institutions. Briberyi refers to the corrupt behaviour between firms and public offi-
cials; that is, the level of corruption. Model (1) includes a quadratic term of corrup-
tion that can measure not only the average effect of corruption on firms’ access to
bank loans but also the possible non-linear relation between corruption and firms’
access to bank loans. Zi denotes a control variable vector that includes the firm-level
characteristics and the characteristics of the city where the firm is located. Model (1)
also includes industry fixed effects and city fixed effects. lk is industry fixed effects
that absorb the effects of industrial variation. xj is city fixed effects, and is used to
tackle the problem of unobservable variables omitted from regional characteristics.
For example, faster economic growth in certain areas is unobservable and correlates
with both corruption and firm financing. ei is the error term.
Previous studies employed multiple evaluation indexes to measure the level of cor-
ruption, such as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Bribe Payers Index (BPI),
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Administrative Corruption Index (ACI), and State Capture Index (SCI). Some studies
also used the proportion of corruption involving malfeasance to the number of local
public officials to measure the degree of corruption. These indexes are influenced by
cultural and psychological factors, and corruption is a hidden and non-public behav-
iour. These indexes therefore cannot accurately reflect the true degree of corruption.
The World Bank uses the Graft Index to measure the direct costs of corruption. This
index measures the degree of corruption by measuring the informal payments or gifts
made by firms to public officials for the successful development of relevant produc-
tion and business activities. Firms’ informal payments include gifts, meals, cash and
other items to seek benefits for firms or individuals. Many scholars have considered
informal payment as a form of corruption that only includes the relationship of
material interests and characterised by direct and immediate payment (Şeker & Yang,
2014; Wu, 2019; Yang, 1989). This study uses the percentage of total informal pay-
ments in the firm’s annual sales to measure the level of corruption in business.
Table 1 reports the definitions of the dependent and independent variables.
3.2. Data
The paper uses data from the People’s Republic of China 2012 Enterprise Surveys
Data Set by the World Bank, which reflects the information of enterprises in fiscal
year 2010. The survey uses the stratified random sampling method according to
enterprises’ domain name; thus, the sample enterprises in this survey are highly rep-
resentative. The survey data are provided by the general managers, accountants,
human resources managers and other enterprise employees. Specifically, this survey
was conducted in 25 cities in China and covered 26 industries, investigating 2,848
Chinese enterprises, including 148 SOEs and 2,700 non-SOEs. After deleting invalid
items, the valid sample in this paper is 1,440 enterprises. This includes 71 SOEs,
accounting for 4.93% of the valid sample, and 1,369 non-SOEs, accounting for
95.07% of the valid sample. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables
used in this article.
4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Corruption and firms’ access to bank loans
Because of reverse causality and omitted variables, a major challenge of this study is
the identification of the causal impacts of corruption on firms’ access to bank loans.
Firm financing is likely endogenous with respect to firm characteristics and market
characteristics, including the business environment. To control the endogeneity prob-
lem and contemporaneous reverse causality, this paper uses an instrumental variable
to estimate the main model.
The World Bank’s survey of the business environment provides many instrumental
variables, including a dummy variable (Electric). If a firm has submitted an applica-
tion to obtain an electrical connection over the past two years, the value of Electric is
1; otherwise, the value of Electric is 0. We believe that the firm’s application to the
authorities is a prerequisite for solving the power problem, and the firm can operate
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normally after the problem is solved. The electricity sector is a natural monopoly that
lacks effective supervision mechanisms, and public officials have the authority to
grant enterprises access to the national power grid. Monopoly is a major cause of cor-
porate bribery and corruption involving public officials (Yang, 2005). Hence, firms’
applications for electricity are associated increased rent-seeking behaviours by officials
because applying to government authorities to use the electricity infrastructure means
that firms have to interact with public officials. In addition, there is no evidence of a
direct correlation between firms submitting applications to obtain electrical connec-
tions and firms obtaining bank loans. Therefore, this variable, Electric, is a good
instrumental variable.
Table 3 reports the results of corruption’s effects on firms’ access to bank loans by
Probit, Tobit, and Instrumental Variable (I.V.) regression. In columns (1), (2), (5),
and (6) of Table 3, the coefficients of corruption, Bribery, are significantly positive at
Table 2. Summary statistics.
Variable Min 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Max Mean Standard deviation
Lend 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0253 0.0510
Bribery 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 30.0000 0.2159 1.5909
Scale 0.6931 2.9957 4.0943 4.8675 10.2400 3.8677 1.3514
Age 0.6931 2.1972 2.4849 2.7726 4.8283 2.4148 0.4756
State 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0486 0.2151
Growth 0.1595 0.0153 0.0489 0.1006 1.2240 0.0791 0.1543
Profit 0.7712 0.0043 0.0059 0.0652 0.5318 0.0092 0.4914
Quality 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5826 0.4933
Audit 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6861 0.4642
City size 1.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.9736 0.2190
Business 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8493 0.3579
Note: Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. The sample size of this paper is 1440. The enterprises surveyed
covered 26 industries, such as Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Garments, Leather, Wood, Paper, Recorded media, Chemicals,
Basic metals, Electronics, Furniture, etc.
Table 1. Variable definitions.
Variable Definition
Lend If a firm has a line of credit or a loan from financial institutions, the value of Lend is 1;
otherwise, the value of Lend is 0
Bribery The percentage of total annual sales paid as informal payments or gifts to public officials.
Note that firms are sometimes required to make informal payments or gifts to public
officials to ‘get things done’ with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations,
services, etc.
Scale Firm size. A firm’s employees. In the empirical test, the data take logarithm form
Age Firm age. The number of years a firm has existed since its founding year. In the empirical
test, the data take logarithm form
State The percentage of a firm’s shares held by state shareholders
Growth The average annual sales growth rate is defined as the three-year average growth rate
Profit Operating margin is defined as the ratio of total profits to sales revenue over the
same period
Quality If a firm has an internationally recognised quality certification, the value of Quality is 1;
otherwise, the value of Quality is 0
Audit If a firm has its annual financial statements checked and certified by an external auditor, the
value of Audit is 1; otherwise, the value of Audit is 0
City size Market size of the city where a firm is located. Cities are divided into four levels: a
population of less than 50,000; 50,000 to 250,000; 250,000 to 1,000,000; and over
1,000,000, with values of 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively
Business If the city where a firm is located is an important commercial city, the value of Business is 1;
otherwise, the value of Business is 0
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the 1% level, which indicates that corruption has significant promoting effects on firms’
access to bank loans. Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Table 3 include the squared terms
(Briberysq) for the corruption variable in the estimations to consider the possible nonlin-
ear relation between corruption and firms’ access to bank loans. Specifically, the linear
terms of corruption are significantly positive at the 1% level, and the squared terms of
corruption are significantly negative at the 1% level, which indicates that there is an
inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption and firms’ access to bank loans. The
results in Table 3 show that the thresholds of corruption are 13.3090 (column 3),
13.8333 (column 4), 11.5613 (column 7), and 11.7917 (column 8). Therefore, before the
levels of corruption reaches the thresholds, the increase in corruption promotes firms’
access to financing from banks. After the levels of corruption crosses the inflection
points, the increase in corruption hinders firms from obtaining financing from banks.
In columns (5) to (8) of Table 3, the results of the Wald test reject the null hypothesis
in the Instrumental Variable regressions, which suggest that corruption is endogenous.
The robustness tests of weak instrumental variables (AR) reject the null hypothesis,
which indicates that there is no problem of weak instrumental variables. The results of
FAR (P) accept the null hypothesis, which suggests that the instrumental variable satis-
fies the exclusion of limitation (Berkowitz et al., 2012).
These findings are consistent with the conclusions of Faccio (2010) and Li et al.
(2008), who argue that corrupt acts help firms overcome market failures and elimin-
ate ideological discrimination to obtain bank loans and reduce borrowing costs.
Toader et al. (2018) and Ali et al. (2019) find that a lower level of corruption results
in higher credit allocation efficiency and moderate credit growth. In addition, banks’
preferences have greater effects on small enterprises, which are excluded from the for-
mal financial system and face more financing constraints than large enterprises
(Adegboye & Iweriebor, 2018; Gonzalez, 2015). As a result, these firms have sufficient
incentives to gain the favour of officials via bribes to evade the investigation of their
credit status and to obtain bank credit. Banks’ investment in relationship lending is
particularly important for small enterprises’ access to bank finance (Fungacova et al.,
2017). Many small firms are forced to engage in bribery to obtain financial resources,
whereas large firms are systematically involved in bribery (Zhou & Peng, 2012).
According to the above viewpoints, corruption can be regarded as a lubricant for
firms to obtain bank loans and can reduce the rigidity of the bank loan institution.
Corruption is not absolutely beneficial, as a higher degree of corruption distorts the
allocation of bank credit resources and increases firms’ operating costs. Because corrupt
bank officials may weigh the best amount of bribery according to the credit status of
enterprises, more bribery does not necessarily entail more credit opportunities for these
enterprises. Corruption is a cost for a firm seeking financing protection from officials. A
higher level of corruption may be due to officials’ failure to fulfil their previous promises
made in exchange for bribes, and these officials may demand more bribes from firms.
In addition, due to information asymmetry, banks have difficulty in identifying firms’
quality, which leads to banks raising loan rates and requiring borrowers to provide
more collateral. In such cases, high-risk firms are more motivated than low-risk firms to
offer larger bribes to compete for bank loans, which results in adverse selection and
moral hazard problems and an increase in non-performing loans. The rise in non-
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performing loan ratio increases bank risks, which leads to the deterioration of loan qual-
ity and the instability of the financial system (Zhang et al., 2016). Our result is consist-
ent with the view that corruption has a negative impact on firm financing and the
allocation efficiency of bank loans (Beck et al., 2006; Wellalage et al., 2019). A possible
explanation is that China lacks a sound financial system and legal system, and that gov-
ernment intervention reduces the efficiency of resource allocation in the financial mar-
ket. However, some studies argue that bribery has nothing to do with firms’ bank
financing channel and bank financing scale (Ruan et al., 2018; Tian et al., 2017).
The results of the control variables are in line with expectations. In Table 3, the coeffi-
cients of firm size (Scale) are significantly positive at the 1% level, which suggests that
large enterprises have more collateral and easier access to bank loans than small enter-
prises. The coefficients of firm age (Age) suggest that there is no causal relationship
between firm age and firms’ access to bank loans. Although banks can obtain more infor-
mation from old enterprises, such information may not be conducive to these enterprises
obtaining bank loans. The coefficients of state-owned share (State) are significantly nega-
tive at the 1% level, which indicates that an increase in the proportion of state-owned
shares reduces the probability of enterprises obtaining bank loans. Because firms with
state ownership can obtain more government shelters, soft budget constraints, and policy
subsidies than non-SOEs, they have more financing channels and lower dependence on
bank loans. The coefficients on the average annual growth rate of firm sales (Growth) are
significantly positive, which is consistent with the previous findings (Chen et al., 2013;
Faccio, 2010). The faster the sales growth of enterprises, the stronger their ability to repay
debts, which implies a lower expected default risk for these enterprises.
The coefficients of firm operating margin (Profit) are negative, but most are not
significant. The result is consistent with that of Rajan and Zingales (1995), who argue
that firm profitability has a negative impact on the debt level, although it is not sig-
nificant in some regions and countries. The coefficients of firm quality (Quality) and
firm financial information transparency (Audit) are significantly positive, which reveal
that the more firms are recognised by external third organisations, the easier it is for
them to obtain bank loans. The coefficients of city scale (City size) are significantly
positive, which suggests that enterprises in large cities can obtain more bank loans.
The coefficients of city business level (Business) are significantly negative. The infor-
mation hypothesis argues that market competition is negatively associated with firms’
access to credit, because competition lowers the incentives of banks to invest in soft
information and relationship lending (Owen & Pereira, 2018). Therefore, the more
prosperous business is in the city where the enterprise is located, the smaller the
share of the enterprises that successfully obtain bank loans. This finding is in line
with the argument that competitive bank markets reduce relationship lending and
increase financial constraints (Berger & Udell, 2002; Berger & Black, 2011).
4.2. The role of government guarantees in corruption affecting firms’ access to
bank loans
This subsection investigates the role of government guarantees in corruption affecting
firms’ access to bank loans. In China, early bank loans were mainly in the form of
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credit. The interest rates for such loans are low, and borrowers are not required to
provide guarantees or collaterals, which leads to an increase in the bank’s non-
performing loans. With the gradual development of financial institutions’ credit risk
awareness, Chinese banks increasingly require borrowers to provide guarantees and
collaterals, especially when providing loans to private firms (Yeung, 2009). Therefore,
many firms are unable to provide qualified guarantees and collaterals, and they are
often excluded from the formal financial system. In addition, state-owned banks and
the government have a discriminatory tendency in the loan-granting process, as they
tend to provide preferential loans to SOEs rather than to private firms (Cull & Xu,
2003; Lin et al., 2015). To obtain government guarantees and bank loans, these firms
may engage in bribery or take part in other corrupt activities to establish political
relations with public officials. Hence, obtaining government guarantees has become
an important channel for firms to obtain bank loans and low-cost funds, as shown in
Figure 1.
We regard government guarantees as a credit mechanism that transmits soft infor-
mation to financial institutions and helps enterprises obtain external financing. This
study employs structural equation modelling path analysis techniques to evaluate the
logical framework in Figure 1. We measure government guarantees (Guarantee) by
whether enterprises have government contracts (if a firm has secured or attempted to
secure a government contract over the last year, the value of Guarantee is 1; other-
wise, the value of Guarantee is 0). The results are shown in Table 4. The goodness of
fit of the structural equation model is 0.6917, and the stability index is close to 0.
These results indicate that the structural equation model meets the stability criteria.
The coefficient of a single path shows that corruption helps enterprises obtain gov-
ernment guarantees (b¼ 0.0126, p< 0.05). Bribery and other corrupt acts have special
effects on resource allocation and enable enterprises to obtain government guarantees,
which help enterprises obtain bank loans (b¼ 0.1308, p< 0.01). Imperfect financial
market systems and harsh listing conditions make it difficult for firms to obtain
external financing in China’s financial market, while firms with government guaran-
tees have easier access to bank loans and face less risk of default. The government
can alleviate the problem of financial institutions refusing to provide funds to high-
risk firms and excluding vulnerable borrowers by introducing state-guaranteed funds
(Ben-Yashar et al., 2018; Wilcox & Yasuda, 2019). Thus, to get around the financing
constraints, firms may obtain government guarantees and bank loans by brib-
ing officials.
Table 5 presents the indirect effects and total effects of corruption on firms’ access
to bank loans. The path coefficient shows that the indirect effect coefficient of gov-
ernment guarantees via bribery on bank loans is 0.0016, which is significant at the
Figure 1. The role of government guarantees in corruption affecting firm financing.
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5% level. This implies that obtaining government guarantees via corrupt acts is an
effective channel for firms to obtain bank loans. The government controls the supply
of vital resources, and banks are thus influenced by the government when providing
funds (Sapienza, 2004).
In Table 5, the total effect coefficients indicate that firms use corrupt behaviour
strategically to obtain government guarantees and bank loans. Entrepreneurs can
influence government policies or obtain government support through bribing officials
(Djankov et al., 2008; Harstad & Svensson, 2011). Moreover, bribery can entice public
officials to ignore firms’ violations and help firms obtain contracts (Wu, 2018).
Therefore, bribery and other corrupt acts could be means of establishing political
connections with officials, which are key ways for firms to obtain market resources
and government guarantees.
4.3. The estimation of generalized propensity score matching
This subsection uses the Generalized Propensity Score Matching (GPSM) method to
check whether the influence of corruption on firms’ bank loan intensity varies across
different levels of corruption. The GPSM of the processing variable (Bribery) is calcu-
lated, and firms’ bank loan intensity (defined as the percentage of loans obtained by a
firm from banks in its annual sales revenue) is taken as the dependent variable. The
degree of corruption (Bribery) is taken as the key explanatory variable, and the gener-
alized tendency score (Pscore) of the processing variable is taken as a control variable.
We then conduct the estimations using the OLS method. Table 6 presents the
Table 4. The structural path coefficients of corruption.
Path Path coefficients S. E. Z-value P>jzj
Bribery ! Guarantee 0.0126 0.0052 2.42 0.015
Constant 0.1198 0.0075 15.89 0.000
Guarantee ! Lend 0.1308 0.0321 4.08 0.000
Bribery !Lend 0.0168 0.0073 2.31 0.021
Constant 0.2874 0.0112 25.56 0.000
Variance
e. Guarantee 0.1068 0.0035
e. Lend 0.2100 0.0068
Log likelihood ¼ 5200.3911
Log Determinant of Sigma¼ 13.4718
Adj_R2 (Greene) ¼0.6917
Stability index¼ 5.71e-10
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. , , and  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Table 5. The indirect effects and total effects of corruption.
Path Path coefficients S. E. Z-value P>jzj
Indirect effects
Bribery ! Lend 0.0016 0.0008 2.08 0.037
Total effects
Bribery !Guarantee 0.0126 0.0052 2.42 0.015
Guarantee ! Lend 0.1308 0.0321 4.08 0.000
Bribery ! Lend 0.0185 0.0073 2.53 0.011
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. , , and  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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estimated results, which show that the coefficients of corruption (Bribery), the
squared term of corruption (Briberysq), and the interaction term (Bribery Pscore)
are all significant. We use these estimation results as the basis for the next step.
Figure 2 illustrates the trends of firms’ bank loan intensity at different corruption
levels. The trend of the dose-response function estimation indicates that the relation-
ship between corruption and firms’ bank loan intensity is inverted U-shaped. As the
corruption level rises from low to high, the positive impact of corruption acts on
firms’ bank loan intensity gradually weakens. When the degree of corruption exceeds
0.18, corruption acts have a restraining effect on firms’ bank loan intensity, and this
negative effect gradually increases.
We divide the sample into several groups according to the range of the corruption
degree and then check the differences in the effects of different degrees of corruption
on firms’ bank loan intensity. The estimation results in Table 7 suggest that when the
degree of corruption is less than or equal to 0.02, corruption promotes firms’ access





Bribery Pscore 0.0445 0.0246
Constant 0.0091 0.0301
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. , , and  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Figure 2. The estimation diagram of dose-response function and treatment effect.
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to bank loans. When the degree of corruption is higher than 0.02, corruption hinders
enterprises from obtaining bank loans, and this inhibitory effect increases with the
increase of corruption degree. These results imply that mild corruption is beneficial
for enterprises seeking bank loans, although severe corruption hinders firms’ access
to bank funds and development.
4.4. Robustness test
This subsection checks the robustness of the main findings using several approaches.
The estimation results are reported in Table 8. First, we conduct a sensitivity analysis
with a substitute variable of corruption. Wang and You (2012) measure corruption
by the days when a firm deals with the government. The length of time that firms
deal with the government is related not only to corruption but perhaps also to the
administrative efficiency. If the influence of administrative efficiency cannot be elimi-
nated, this method may result in incorrect regression results. Therefore, we use the
percentage of total senior management time spent dealing with the requirements
imposed by government regulations as a substitute variable (Corruption) to measure
corruption. The regression results are shown in columns (1) to (4) of Table 8. The
coefficients of the linear terms (Corruption) of corruption are significantly positive,
and the squared terms (Corruptionsq) for corruption variable are significantly nega-
tive, which indicates an obvious inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption
and firms’ access to bank loans. These results align with the main estimations and
confirm the robustness of our results.
Second, this study explores the role of institutional quality in corruption affecting
firms’ access to bank loans. This study measures institutional quality using enter-
prises’ evaluation of the court system (Item: ‘The court system is fair, impartial and
uncorrupted.’ Answers and variable assignments: strongly disagree ¼ 1, tend to dis-
agree ¼ 2, tend to agree ¼ 3, strongly agree ¼ 4). We include the variable of institu-
tional quality (Law) and the interaction term between institutional quality and
corruption (Law_Corruption) as control variables in the regression model. The results
are shown in columns (1) to (4) of Table 8. The regression results show that when
controlling the institutional quality faced by firms, the relationship between corrup-
tion and firms’ access to bank loans is still inverted U-shaped. The coefficients of
Law are significantly positive at the 1% level, which indicates that increased institu-
tional quality promotes firms’ access to bank loans. The coefficients of
Law_Corruption reveal that the improvement of institutional quality weakens the
Table 7. The effects of corruption on firms’ bank loan intensity.






Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. , , and  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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impact of corruption on firms’ access to bank loans, and the effects of corruption are
replaced by the resource allocation function of market mechanisms.
Similarly, Wang and You (2012) find a substitution relationship between corrup-
tion acts and financial markets on firm growth. Because of the inherent institutional
weakness in transition economies, corruption has a potential positive impact on the
new product innovation by enterprises (Xie et al., 2019). A possible interpretation is
that high-quality formal institutions stimulate the market to allocate resources effi-
ciently, which reduces the discretionary space for public officials and the scale of
rent-seeking. Higher quality of institutions weakens the adverse effects of collectivism
on bank corruption (El Ghoul et al., 2016). However, firms have a higher probability
of bribery to compete for better resources when they face poor institutional environ-
ments and extraneous administrative procedures, such as opaque legal interpretations,
inefficient administrative services, and corrupt court systems (Huang & Rice, 2012;
Wu, 2009; Zhou et al., 2013).
Finally, this study divides the enterprises into two subsamples according to indus-
try categories (i.e., the manufacturing industry and the retail and service industry)
and conducts separate analyses. The regression results are reported in columns (5)
and (6) of Table 8. The linear terms of corruption (Bribery) are significantly positive,
and the squared terms (Briberysq) are significantly negative. These results reveal a
nonlinear relationship between corrupt acts and firm financing: initially, the corrup-
tion level increases and firm financing increases, but corruption hinders enterprises
from obtaining external financing after the corruption level reaches the inflection
point. These results indicate that the relationship between corruption and firms’
access to bank loans is inverted U-shaped in both the manufacturing industry (col-
umn 5) and the retail and service industry (column 6), which confirms the robustness
of the main results.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
This study investigates the effects of corruption on firms’ access to bank loans. The
data are obtained from a 2012 survey of Chinese enterprises’ business environment
by the World Bank. The estimation results reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship
between corrupt acts and firms’ access to bank loans. A low degree of corruption can
help firms obtain bank loans, but a high degree of corruption hinders firms from
obtaining bank loans. In addition, corruption affects firms’ access to external financ-
ing by enabling them to obtain government guarantees which are positively associated
with firm financing. Institutional quality has a positive relation with the allocation of
bank credit, and the impact of corruption on firm external financing weakens in
regions where institutional quality is high, which suggests that institutional quality
enhances the resource allocation function of market mechanisms. These results show
that corruption is an alternative for the lack of formal institutions and is an import-
ant way for firms to obtain bank loans. Financial resources allocation can realise
Pareto sub-optimality among firms depending on the amount of bribery. Fortunately,
with the establishment and improvement of formal institutions, corrupt activities will
gradually decrease. These findings are significant for the reform of banking systems,
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the construction of clean governments and the allocation of financial resources in
developing countries.
First, a sound financial system should be built to ensure that firms have fair
opportunities to enter financial markets. A perfect market plays an important role in
promoting the efficiency of resource allocation and is the basis upon which firms
obtain external funds through a formal financial system. However, in many develop-
ing countries, credit allocation is still dominated by the government, which has great
discretion in formulating resource allocation policies. Excessive government interven-
tion in resource allocation is an important reason for financial market failure. State
ownership of the media is related to a higher degree of corruption in bank lending
(Houston et al., 2011). Fortunately, information sharing and bank competition reduce
lending corruption, and information sharing helps enhance the positive role of com-
petition in curbing lending corruption (Barth et al., 2009). The negative impact of
collectivism on corruption in bank lending is less serious in countries where the pro-
portion of state-owned banks is low (El Ghoul et al., 2016; Zheng et al., 2013).
Therefore, developing countries need to optimise the operational mechanism of the
financial market and accelerate the transformation of financial resources allocation
from government-led to market-led.
Second, anti-corruption efforts should be strengthened and a clean government
should be established. The function of the government is to construct a market-based
resource allocation mechanism to address the adverse effect of market failure on
enterprises’ external financing. However, corruption is a kind of rent-seeking behav-
iour that originates from the power of public officials. The lack of effective supervi-
sion and restriction on public officials is one of the reasons for the widespread
occurrence of rent-seeking by officials and bribery by firms. Moreover, inefficient
enterprises are more inclined to bribe than to invest (Birhanu et al., 2016), and a
high bribery level is associated with low corporate performance (Hanousek &
Kochanova, 2016; Şeker & Yang, 2014). Haider et al. (2018) find that the correlation
between state ownership and firms’ financial constraints is not obvious in countries
with less corruption. It is therefore necessary to intensify anti-corruption efforts and
improve the effectiveness of legislative acts (Luzgina, 2017; Osipov et al., 2018), thus
creating a favourable external environment for firm financing. The government
should withdraw from the resource allocation market and reduce its intervention in
areas that the market economy can manage well.
These conclusions are useful for the construction of the market economy and gov-
ernment reform in transition economies. However, there are some deficiencies in this
study. The World Bank did not follow up with the sample firms studied in this art-
icle. We therefore have to use cross-sectional data for empirical study and cannot use
this sample to study the long-term effects of corruption on firm financing.
Corruption is a sensitive topic and is not public knowledge, so corruption in this art-
icle is measured by informal payment, an indirect variable. In addition, this paper
does not consider the effects of regional banking competition on firm financing,
which is important for policy makers. Previous studies examine the effects of banking
competition on firm financing in developed economies, but seldom analyze the
impact of banking competition changes in developing countries. Banks in emerging
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markets hold most of the free capital and are the main sources of financing for enter-
prises, whereas the equity market is relatively small compared with the loan market.
Therefore, future research can extend this study by exploring the effects of banking
competition on firms’ access to bank loans in emerging markets and how both firm
characteristics shape the influence of banking competition.
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